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TAXATION OF COMPENSATORY STOCK OPTIONS:
CAPITAL GAIN OR ORDINARY INCOME*
FOR tax purposes I courts divide stock options given to corporation execu-
tives 2 into two categories: proprietary options designed to develop long-term
loyalty to stockholders,3 and compensatory options,4 which, like cash, are
*Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954); McNamara v. Com-
missioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954).
1. The question of whether or not an option is compensation may arise in a number
of ways: (a) the Commissioner may seek to tax the employee on the exercise spread,
claiming it is compensation; Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945); Van Dusen v.
Commissioner, 166 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1948) ; (b) the Commissioner may attempt to deny
the employer a deduction for compensation; Gardner-Denver . Commissioner, 75 F.2d 38
(7th Cir. 1935); Alger-Sullivan v. Commissioner, 57 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1932); (c) the
statute of limitations having barred a claim of compensation at exercise, the Commissioner
may try to reduce the basis of the employee's stock; 'Merhengeod Corp. v. Helvering, 89
F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ; Bothwell v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1935).
2. Executive stock options have been popular since the 1920's. They thrive in in-
flationary periods when large corporate profits are expccted. For a general discussion
of their use, terms and profitableness see Baker, Stock Options for Executives, 19 H,%Rv.
Bus. REv. 106 (1940).
The Treasury first moved to tax stock options in 1923. T.D. 3435, I-1 Cum. Buu..
50 (1923). Since then they have provoked a great deal of litigatijn and comment. In
general see Alex.-ander, Employee Stock Options and the 1950 Revenue Act, 6 TAx L REV.
165 (1951) ; Atlas, Toward a Concept of Compensation, 2 TAx L. PEv. 85 (1946) ; Boland,
Employee Options Under the Federal Income Tax, 28 T.xEs 415 (1930); Dean, Em-
ployee Stock Options, 66 HAR. I RE-. 1403 (1953); Ferrall, Employee Stock Options
and the Smith Case, 1 TAx L. REv. 225 (1946); Friedman & Silbert, Stock Options and
Stock Purchase Plans, N.Y.U. 8TE INST. ox FED. TAx. 433 (1950); Lyon, Employee
Stock Purchase Arrangements, 31 TAxEs 1021 (1953); Lyon, Employee Stock Optiom
Under the Revente Act of 1950, 51 Cox. L. REv. 1 (1951); Tyler, Stock Options, 24
TAX Es 611 (1946) ; Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 706 (1947).
Stock options have been issued to investment bankers in return for underwriting
services since 1692. HAVEN, INVE sT1ENT BANKING UxDE THE SEcURITIES tAN Ex-
cHANGE Commissio 110 (1940). For a discussion of such options see id. at 110 et scq.
Options have also been granted by corporations to their customers. 2 Dnwi.NG, Frzx.cLa
PoLicy OF CoR0RAToNs 1216 (4th ed. 1941). See FoERsTER & Dicma., EmLoYwvz STocx
OwNmsnin IN Tm UNITED STATES (1927) for a survey of options held by non-executive
employees. GRAxHAm & DoDD, SEcuRT, ANALysis c. 46 (1st ed. 1934) is a study of
stock options from a securities viewpoint.
3. Philip J. LoBue, 22 T.C. No. 58 (1954); Abraham Rosenberg, 20 T.C. 5 (1953);
Delbert B. Geeseman, 38 B.T.A. 258 (1938) ; cf. Edward Egan, P-H 1953 TC MMI. DC.
f[ 53,266 (1953) (independent contractor). Proprietary options are designed to narrow
the separation of ownership and management begun in post Civil War years. Their function
is to make it possible for managers to become owners. Lyon, Employee Stock Purchase
Arrangements, 31 TAxEs 1021 (1953). The corporation seeks to have the executive
devote himself to the permanent interest of the stockholders rather than to his own shorter
affiliation as employee.
By a 1950 amendment to the Code Congress permitted corporations to issue to their
employees restricted options which receive favorable tax treatment. INT. PRv. CorE or
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
payments for services. Though the distinction has been questioned,0 courts
continue to hold that if an option is proprietary, neither the value of the
option nor the stock yielded by its exercise is taxable income to the employee. 7
1939, § 130A. To qualify an option must: (a) be granted in connection with employment;
(b) have a maximum issue spread of 15%; (c) be transferrable only by death, and during
the employee's life be exercisable only by him; and (d) not be issued to employees holding
more than 10% of the employer's stock. The benefits are lost if the stock is sold within
two years of the grant of the option or within six months of exercise. See Lyon, Employee
Stock Options Under the Revenue Act of 1950, 51 COL. L. REv. 1 (1951). Section 130A
was liberalized by the 1954 Code. INT. REV. CODE § 421. Many corporations have been
induced to change their proprietary options to qualify under the Act. Proposed Accounting
Rule, SEC Press Release No. 4803-X, Feb. 25, 1953. However, an option which does not
qualify under § 130A may still be proprietary if T.D. 5507, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 18, is not
upheld. See authorities cited in note 26 infra; cf. James C. Hazelton, P-H 1953 TC Mu:M.
DEC. f 53,123 (1953).
4. Compensatory options are designed to enable employees to make bargain purchases
of their employers' stock. Connolly's Estate v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1943) ,
Albert Russel Erskine, 26 B.T.A. 147 (1932) ; Charles E. Sorenson, 22 T.C. No. 44 (1954).
For a discussion of the criteria used to distinguish compensatory and proprietary options,
see note 8 infra.
Compensatory options may be issued in return for an agreement not to compete; Salvage
v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1935), aff'd, 297 U.S. 106 (1936) ; and they may be
issued by a stockholder rather than by the corporation; Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 10
F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1948).
5. Many types of benefits have been used to compensate employees. Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (income taxes) ; Allen v. Commissioner, 107 F.2d
151 (4th Cir. 1939) (stock) ; J. H. McEwen, 6 T.C. 1018 (1946) (trust fund) ; George
Matthew Adams, 18 B.T.A. 381 (1929) (insurance premiums) ; Ralph Kitchen, 11 B.T.A.
855 (1928) (hotel accomodations). But cf. Arthur Benaglia, 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937) (not
compensation if for convenience of employer).
6. "[T]he old regulation, which made the test turn on the existence of compensation,
was a little like repealing the law of gravity. I really do not see how it is possible to give
a stock option to an executive which is not available to anyone else, without its
being compensation." Letter from Erwin N. Griswold, Dean, Harvard Law School, re-
printed in SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION 603 (2d ed. 1953) ; Atlas, supra
note 2, at 91-2; Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 706, 712 (1947) ; Wentz, Remedying the Effect of
Taxation an Management Ozwnership of Corporate Stock, 48 N.U.L. REv. 442, 458 (1953).
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the question but has indicated in a dictum that the
concept of compensation is very broad. See Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181
(1945).
In 1923 the Commissioner took the position that all options were compensatory. T.D.
3435, 11-1 Cum. BuLL. 50 (1923). But the courts disagreed with him, see cases cited note
7 infra, and in 1939 the Commissioner recognized non-compensatory options. T.D. 4879,
1939-1 Cum. BULL. 159. Following the Smith decision, supra, the Commissioner returned
to his 1923 ruling. T.D. 5507, 1946-1 Cumt. BULL. 18. However, it does not seem that
T.D. 5507 will be upheld. Cf. Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954);
and see note 26 infra.
7. Despite T.D. 3435, II-1 Cum. BULL 50 (1923), non-compensatory options were
recognized in Rossheim v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1937) ; Merhengood Corp,
v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ; and Delbert B. Geeseman, 38 B.T.A. 258
(1938). Cases decided after Smith have also applied the distinction. Philip J. LoBue,
22 T.C. No. 58 (1954); Abraham Rosenberg, 20 T.C. 5 (1953); Norman G. Nicolson, 13
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On the other hand, if an option is regarded as compensatory,8 the tax conse-
quences differ. In this situation courts have held that the amount of compensa-
tion is the difference between the market value of the stock at exercise and
the price called for by the option.9 This "exercise spread" has been taxed at
ordinary income rates at the time of exercise.10
Two recent cases, however, allow the employee to pay tax on part of the
exercise spread at capital gain rates." They do so by regarding the option
itself as compensation rather than as a contract right to acquire compensation.12
Only the option's value at receipt is considered income;1 a subsequent in-
crease in value realized by sale is viewed as a capital gain.1 4
T.C. 690 (1949); ef. Ray A. Noland, P-H 1953 TC Mftm. DEc. f 53, (1953). But
see Wanda V. Van Dusen, 8 T.C. 388, 391-3, aft'd, 166 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1948).
S. Courts say that the intent of the employer and the executive determines whether
an option is compensatory. Philip J. LoBue, 22 T.C. No. 58 (1954) ; Abraham Rosenberg,
20 T.C. 5 (1953). But see Wanda V. Van Dusen, 8 T.C. 388, 391-3 (1947), aff'd, 1M6
F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1948). However, testimony as to intent carries little weight. See
Albert Russel Erskine, 26 B.T.A. 147 (1932). Nor do recitals govern. Abraham Rosen-
berg, 20 T.C. 5 (1953). A deduction by the employer may show his intent, Will1de v.
Commissioner, 127 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1942), but it is not binding on the employee.
Estate of Lauson Stone, 19 T.C. 872, 878 (1953).
It is extremely difficult for courts to ascertain the intent of parties in this area.
Blodgett, Deferred Compensation of Executives, N.Y.U. 6rn INsT. o. Frm. TAx. 764,
812 (1948). Sax, Stock Options, 23 TAxEs 505 (1954), advises optionees of fifty charac-
teristics which should be associated with their options in order to establish a proprietary
intent; he warns of thirty-eight to be avoided as indicating a compensatory plan. But the
factor on which the courts place most weight is the issue spread. Lyon, Employee Slok
Options Under the Revenue Act of 1950, 51 COL. L. REv. 1, S (1951).
Whether the intent of the parties is relevant has been questioned. Atlas, mspra note
2 at 91-2; Comment, 56 YAI.E L.J. 706, 707 (1947). It may be argued that Commissioner v.
Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945), where the court found a compensatory intent despite the
absence of an issue spread, in effect removed the intent question. T.D. 5507, 1946-1 Cum.
Bum. 18, adopted this interpretation. But see cases cited note 7 supra. And ef. Bogardus
v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937).
9. E.g., Connolly's Estate, 45 B.T.A. 374 (1941), aff'd, 135 F.2d 64 (CUh Cir. 1943);
Edward J. Epsen, 44 B.T.A. 322 (1941) ; Albert Russel Erskine, 26 B.T.A. 147 (1932).
10. See cases cited note 9 supra. Prior to Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F2d
33 (3d Cir. 1954), there were no decisions on whether the sale price of the option would
be income to the executive if it were sold instead of exercised. But see Commissioner
v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945). I.T. 3795, 1946-1 CL-m. BeLL. 15, considers the
sale price compensation if the taxpayer disposes of the option in an arms length transfer.
11. Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954); McNamara v.
Commissioner, 210 F2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954).
12. Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33, 35 (3d Cir. 1954) ; MeNanmra v.
Commissioner, 210 F2d 505, 508-10 (7th Cir. 1954). Both cases relied on a dictum by
Chief Justice Stone in the Smith case: "It of course does not follow that in other circum-
stances not here present the option itself, rather than the proceeds of its exercise, could
not be found to be the only intended compensation." Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S.
177, 182 (1945).
13. Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33, 35 (3d Cir. 1954) ; McNamara v.
Commissioner, 210 F2d 505, 503-10 (7th Cir. 1954).
14. Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33, 34 (3d Cir. 1954) ; ef. Ben F. Read,
19541
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In McNamara v. Commissioner 11 the employee was given a two-year option
which he exercised the following year. In Commissioner v. Stonc's Estate "o
the executive made a bargain purchase of a five-year option which he sold after
more than six months had elapsed. In both cases the taxpayers reported the
receipt of their options as compensation, estimating their values.' 7 Both
courts held that the option was property with a market value and was the
intended compensation.18 The two decisions skirted I.T. 3795 10 in which
the Treasury had adopted the exercise spread formula. In Stone it was dis-
tinguished by both the Tax Court 20 and the Third Circuit ;21 they held that
it applies solely to outright grants of options and not to bargain purchases. 2
In McNamara the Tax Court found no need to determine the applicability
of the I.T. because the court thought the evidence showed the exercise spread
was the intended compensation.2 3 The Seventh Circuit reversed the finding of
P-H 1954 TC MEm. DEc. 1 54,044 (195'). In Store the court relied on a Treasury regu-
lation, T.D. 5507, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 18, to reach this conclusion, but it rejected the
Treasury's contrary interpretation of the regulation in I.T. 3795, id. at 15. Commissioner
v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33, 34-5 (3d Cir. 1954).
An increase confirmed by exercise is not taxed immediately since exercise is not a
taxable event. Cf. Helvering v. San Joaquin Co., 297 U.S. 496, 500 (1936); MaItLL,
TAXABLE INCOME 119 (1936). However, the increase is taxed as a capital gain when the
employee sells his stock. INT. REv. CODE §§ 1012, 1222. But if the option remains unsold
at the employee's death, its basis is revalued, and no capital gain is realized by the em-
ployee or his estate. INT. REv. CODE § 1014. If the optionee is a stockholder, exercise may
be a taxable event. See note 30 infra. For a discussion of the tax consequences when an
option expires, see note 66 infra.
15. 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954). McNamara's option had an issue spread of
$3.00. It was assignable, but exercise, which was not conditioned on McNamara's con-
tinued employment, had to be in installments. McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505,
506, 507 (7th Cir. 1954).
16. 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954). The option issued to Stone had a minus issue spread
of $1.25. After six months it was exercisable by bearer, but at all times the optionee was
protected against dilution of his option. Estate of Lauson Stone, 19 T.C. 872, 874 (1953).
17. Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33, 34 (3d Cir. 1954); McNamara v.
Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 1954).
Stone's estimate was later used as a basis for figuring his capital gain. Commissioner
v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33, 34 (3d Cir. 1954). McNamara's estimate will become part
of the basis of his stock. T.D. 5507, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 18.
18. See note 12 supra. Cf. John C. Wahl, 19 T.C. 651 (1953).
19. 1946-1 CUM. BULL. 15. The I.T. was announced simultaneously with T.D. 5507,
1946-1 Cum. BU.L 18, which ruled that all employee options issued after February 26,
1945, were compensatory.
20. Estate of Lauson Stone, 19 T.C. 872, 878 (1953).
21. Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33, 34 (3d Cir. 1954).
22. Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33, 34-5 (3d Cir. 1954). The advice in LT.
3795, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 15, was directed to the taxing of an option granted to an em.
ployee. However, the I.T. also provides for the lapse of an option paid for by an employee.
Id. at 16; cf. T.D. 5507, id. at 18; and see Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181
(1945). The distinction of the Third Circuit appears to be based on the idea that, in
calling the exercise spread compensation in every case, the Treasury is creating income
by regulation. See discussion in note 26 infra.
23. Harley v. McNamara, 19 T.C. 1001 (1953).
[Vol. 64
NOTES
intent 24 but failed to discuss the I.T.2 Both decisions are in accord with the
trend of hostility towards the Treasury formula.2 They indicate that it vill
not be upheld, but if it is, Stone points the way to avoidance by use of the
b.argain purchase device.
Stone and McNanara attempt to remove a distinction between employees
and investors created by earlier cases.2 7 Formerly most employees holding
In the Smith case the Supreme Court ruled that the measure of compensation was
based on the intent of the corporation and the employee. Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S.
177 (1945). Following this approach the Tax Court r.ached the same result it would
have had it applied the I.T. The court thought that the sale price of the option %%s
unknown and that the parties did not contemplate a sale. Also, since the option vas exer-
cisable in stages, the taxpayer might have to make a sacrifice if he disposed of it im-
mediately. Furthermore, he expected its value to increase as a result of his services,
an increase a present purchaser might not be willing to recognize. Thercfore, the Tax
Court concluded that the exercise spread was the intended compensation. Id. at 1010-1.
24. The court agreed that the option was intended to be compensatory, McNamara
v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505, 507-8 (7th Cir. 1954), but three factors persuaded the
court that the contemplated compensation was the option itself: (a) the refercnces in
the option and the employment contract to compensation for the year of issue; (b) re-
.porting the issue of the option by the employer and the employee in their tax returns,
and (c) the fact that the issue spread was kept constant during several months of nego-
tiations. Id. at 508-9.
In previous cases the words used by the parties were of little or no effect. Clarence
L. Landen, 1. T.C. M. 411, 415 (1943) ("legalistic verbiage"); Albert Russel Erskine, 26
B.T.A. 147, 157 (1932) (look to the thing, not the language); ef. Herbert IL Spring-
ford, 41 B.T.A. 1001, 1002 (1940) (proprietary option despite compensatory language) ;
Gordon M. Evans, 38 B.T.A. 1406, 1407 (1938) (same). Nor has the tax action taken
by the parties been determinative. Abraham Rosenberg, 20 T.C. 5 (1953); Estate of
Lauson Stone, 19 T.C. 872 (1953) ; cf. Charles E. Sorensen, 22 T.C. No. 44 (1954). While
McNamara's employer kept the issue spread approximately constant, his vithholding
McNamara's right to immediate exercise was inconsistent wtih a desire to grant precisely
the issue spread. McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F2d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 1954).
25. The taxpayer argued that the I.T. was inapplicable because it was retroactive
and was not justified by the case law. Brief for Petitioner, bp. 25-30, McNanara v. Com-
missioner, 210 F2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954). But see Commissivner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177,
181 (1954) ; Wanda V. Van Dusen, & T.C. 388, 391-3 (1947), aft'd, 16 F2d 647 (9th
Cir. 1948). For a discussion of the Treasury's authority to make regulations see Eisen.
stein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tar Administratiun, 58 HAnv. L R Ev. 477 (1945).
See also Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 706, 715 (1947).
26. The first case decided after Smith did not think the intent question was inuatwd,
James M. Lamond, P-H 1946 TC Mini. Dc. fI46,023 (1946). And later cases have
followed suit. See, e.g., Norman G. Nicolson, 13 T.C. 690 (1949); Malcolm C. Clark,
P-H 1950 TC MINI. DEc. ff 50,210 (1950) ; James C. Hazelton, P-H 1953 TC MED!. DEc.
ff 53,123 (1953) ; Philip J. LoBue, 22 T.C. No. 58 (1954). See also Lyon, Employee Stdc
Options Under the Revenue Act of 1950, 51 CoL L. RE:v 1, 12-17 (1951). But see Wanda
V. Van Dusen, 8 T.C. 388, 391-3 (1947), aff'd, 166 F2d 647 (9th Cir. 1948). A CGn-
gressional committee has suggested the Commissioner's rulings were invalid: "[YJuur
committee believes these regulations go beyond the decision of the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Smith. ... The resulting uncertainty as to whether the-e regulations
are in accordance with the law is an additional reason for legislative action. . . ." SE:.
R p. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1950).
27. See cases cited note 9 supra and note 29 infra. Compare Commissiuner v. Smith,
1954]
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compensatory stock options were taxed at ordinary income rates when their
options increased in value,28 while non-employee investors possessing similar
options received capital gain treatment.29 The Stone-McNamara position is
that where an employee relinquishes part of his salary in return for a stock
option, the employee has made an investment and should be taxed accord-
ingly.30
In removing this disparity Stone and McNanmra introduce several others.
The first is a distinction between employees holding options and those with
profit-sharing employment contracts not qualified under Section 401 of the
Code. 31 The profit-sharer is not taxed on the value of the sharing clause at
the time he enters into his contract,3 2 and when his profits are realized they
are taxed at ordinary rates.33 Yet the two devices are functionally similar.
Both are designed to make executive compensation vary with business pros-
324 U.S. 177 (1945), with Ben F. Read, P-H 1954 TC M iEm. DEc. i 54,044 (1954). See
Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 706, 710 (1947). In no case was an employee issued an option
identical to those being traded on securities markets. In such a situation the taxpayer
might possibly have prevailed with the argument that proved successful in Stone and
McNamara. But cf. Connolly's Estate v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1943)
(option with large issue spread which could have been sold) ; Albert Russel Erskine, 26
B.T.A. 147 (1932) (option with assignable value).
28. See authorities cited notes 9 and 27 supra.
29. E.g., Mack v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1945) ; Merhengood Corp. v.
Helvering, 89 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Harold B. Franklin, 34 B.T.A. 927 (1936);
cf. Helvering v. San Joaquin Co., 297 U.S. 496 (1936). See also G.C.M. 23677, 1943
Cum. BULL. 370.
The cost of the option plus the price called for at its exercise comprise the stock's
basis. When the stock is sold, the bargain purchase yielded by the option is taxed as a
capital gain. INT. REv. CODE §§ 1012, 1222. For the treatment of the lapse of an option,
see note 66 infra.
30. "Authorities aside there would seem to be little trouble about this problem since
the law does make a distinction between capital gain and ordinary income .... It would
seem, then, as a matter of principle that when the taxpayer received this thing of value
... and turned it into cash ... that, it being a 'capital transaction,' he should be treated
as in any other capital transaction .. " Goodrich, J., Commissioner v. Stone's Estate,
210 F.2d 33, 34 (3d Cir. 1954). See Lyon, Employee Stock Purchase Arrangcnents, 31
TAXES 1021, 1027 (1953).
Note that an option (stock right) issued by a corporation to its stockholders may be a
concealed dividend. Choate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1942); cf. Charles
M. Cooke, Ltd., 2 T.C. 147 (1943). If so, it is taxable at the time of exercise or ,;ale.
There is a conflict of authority as to the amount of dividend income. Compare G.C.M.
25063, 1947-1 Cums. BULL. 45 (exercise spread), with Choate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d
684, 687 (2d Cir. 1942) (lesser of the exercise or issue spreads).
31. I,;T. Rxv. CODE § 401. This section was formerly part of § 165 of the 1939 Code.
32. Cf. Block & Kohner Co. v. United States, 37 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1930) ; George
K. Gann, 41 B.T.A. 388 (1940); Thurlow E. McFall, 34 B.T.A. 108 (1936). See also
cases cited note 33 infra.
33. Sloane v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1951). This is true even though
they come from the sale of the contract rights. E.g., A. L. Parker, 5 T.C. 1355 (19415);
Estate of Thomas F. Remington, 9 T.C. 99 (1947).
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perity.3 4 A contract right to share in corporate profits is the more direct
technique, but an option's value comes from the same source: corporate income
which maintains or advances stock prices. 3  If the percent of profits were to
be paid with stock, the two devices would be almost indistinguishable.36 Nor
should it be significant that an option may be a separate writing 3 7 and contain
words of assignability,38 for a sharer-employee may also transfer his rights.-1
34. An empirical study of the use of employee stock options by Baker, Stock Options
for Executives, 19 HAuv. Bus. RE,. 106, 109 (1940), shows that options are generally
employed when a business needs exceptional performance by its executives to make it
profitable. At the time of founding or reorganizing the prospect of unusually large
rewards is used to attract men likely to assure corporate success. See McNamara v. Com-
missioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954); Garner & Forsythe, Stock Warrants and
Rights, 4 So. CALIF. L R -. 269, 375, 379 (1931). Deferred compensation is not the
heart of stock options because they are not normally used to carry static spreads tax-free
to post-retirement years. Rather, it is expected that a large spread will develop in a
few years, and the executive will take his profit at that time. Baker, supra at 113-114.
If the position of the taxpayers in Stone and McAramnara were adopted, the issue spread
would be taxed immediately, leaving no room for deferred compensation. However, the
taxpayer would then have a capital asset giving him the power to determine when to
realize capital gain on post-issue appreciation. This might be of great value since the
taxpayer could decide to realize gain only in those years in which he had offsetting
capital losses.
35. GRAHAm & DODD, SEcur-TY Ax.uysis 543 (1st ed. 1934); Baker, supra note
34, at 113-114. Speculative stocks may advance without corporate profits, but most issuers
of employee options use them at times when profits are expected to cause price rises. Se
note 34 supra. Options may also have trading values (even in the absence uf a spread),
and the optionee may take his profit by selling. Garner & Forsythe, stipra note 34, at
271. But trading prices may not approach the vast gains to be made by exercising (or
selling at the peak of the spread), and it is questionable how many employee optionees
choose to receive their compensation by this route. For examples of the profitableness of
options, see note 54 infra.
36. They would differ only when the optionee failed to exercise; however, Baker,
supra note 34, at 113-114, shows that the executive generally will exercise when he thinks
his spread is maximum.
37. Many options are incorporated into the employment contract. Balzer, supra
note 34, at 108. To make the tax distinction depend on a second piece of paper is absurd.
Cf. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). No significance was attached to the
fact that M.-'ffcNamara's option was a separate document. McNamara v. Commissioner,
210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954).
38. The option in the Smith case was assignable, but the Supreme Court did nut
regard the fact of sufficient importance to require comment. But cf. Estate of Lauson
Stone, 19 T.C. 872, 877 (1953).
A "negotiable" option may not be negotiable within the meaning of the Negotiable
Instruments Law since it is not a promise to pay money. See Garner & Forsythe, supra
note 34, at 387-91. Nevertheless an option may be assignable. See Manhattan Co. v.
Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 50, 150 N.E. 594, 598 (1926). Note that profit made by a corporate
executive on the transfer of a stock option within six months of its issue may have tu be
returned to the employer. 48 STAT. 881, 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (1946). See, e.g.,
Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951). See also
Hardee, Stock Options and the "Insider Trading" Provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act, 65 IHARv. L. REv. 997 (1952).
39. State Street Furniture Co. v. Armour & Co., 345 Ill. 160, 177 N.E. 702 (1931).
The employee's rights need not be earned at the time of assignment. Citizens' Loan
1954]
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Moreover, the Stone-McNamara decisions make it possible for corporation
executives to reap tax advantages greater than those allowed any other
group.40 Although in two related areas Congress has made exceptions to
the general rule of taxing compensation at ordinary income rates in the year
earned, both exceptions carry drawbacks and limitations not present in the
rule of Stone and McNamara. Pension and trust plans which qualify tinder
Section 401 of the Code 41 allow employees to defer the payment of tax and
to obtain capital gain advantages ;42 restricted stock options tinder Section 421
offer similar features. 43 But qualified pension and trust plans may not be con-
fined to executives, 44 and capital gain treatment is severely limited. 45 Re-
Ass'n v. Boston & M.R.R., 196 Mass. 528, 82 N.E. 696 (1907). Assignment is possible
despite a contractual provision to the contrary. State Street Furniture Co. v. Armour
& Co., 345 Il1. 160, 177 N.E. 702 (1931). Contra: Reef v. Mills Novelty Co., 126 Tex.
380, 89 S.W.2d 210 (1936). If assignment is impossible, the employee could contract to
take as trustee. See United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1950). For
a general discussion of assignability of profit-sharing rights, see 4 AM. JuR., Assign-
ments, §§ 41-6 (1936).
40. The tax advantages available to corporation executives through restricted stock
options are equalled only by the treatment given to the armed forces in Korea. Lyon,
Employee Stock Options Under the Revenue Act of 1950, 51 COL. L. Rnv. 1, 55 n.126
(1951). The Stone-McNamnara approach is even more liberal to corporate executives
since it avoids the limitations imposed by Congress on restricted options. See text at
notes 46-8 infra.
41. INT. REv. CODE § 401. This section was formerly part of § 165 of the 1939 Code.
42. 1 NT. R.Ev. CODE §§ 401, 402, 501(a). These sections were formerly § 165 of the
1939 Code. The benefits available under these sections include: (a) employers may
receive current deductions for compensation expenses, while employees may postpone the
reporting of income until payments are received; (b) if all payments are made in a
single year after retirement, they qualify for capital gain rates: (c) income earned on
employer contributions is not taxed as realized: (d) unrealized value appreciation on
employer stock may not be taxed at the time of distribution. Furthermore, the risk of
employer insolvency is removed. See discussion by Rice, Incentives for Execulives of
Small Corporations, 32 TAXES 222 (1954) ; Childs, Deferred Compensation Plans for
Executives, 31 TAXES 1007 (1953).
Deferred compensation may also be possible under non-qualified individual contracts.
See, e.g., Shuster v. Helvering, 121 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1941) ; James F. Oates, 18 T.C.
570, appealed, P-H FED. TAX CITATOR 6154 (7th Cir. 1952); Howard Veit, 8 T.C. 809
(1947). But under the constructive receipt doctrine there may be immediate taxation. See,
e.g., Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930); Richard R. Deupree, 1 T.C. 113 (1942).
Even if taxation is postponed, there is no opportunity for capital gain treatment.
43. INT. REv. CODE § 421. This section was originally enacted in 1950 as § 130A
of the 1939 Code.
Taxation is postponed until the disposal of stock obtained by exercise. If the issue
spread is 5% or less, all appreciation will be capital gain. An issue spread of 5% to 15%
will be taxed as ordinary income, with post-issue appreciation treated as capital gain. See
discussion in Lyon, Employee Stock Options Under the Revenue Act of 1950, 51 CoL. L.
REv. 1 (1951). For the qualifications of restricted options see note 3 supra.
44. INT. REv. CODE §§ 401, 501(a). See Tavannes Watch Co. v. Commissioner, 176
F.2d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 1949).
45. It is only available if the employee takes all his benefits in the year following
separation. INT. Rlv. CODE § 402. See discussion in Rice, supra note 42, at 224.
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stricted options may not be transferred inter vivos by employees,46 and the
stock they yield must be held two years after granting of the option.4 7 Further-
more, employers using restricted option plans are denied deductions for com-
pensation.48 It is questionable whether courts should strain the concept of
investment property 49 to permit any group benefits greater than those granted
by Congress. 50
Another consequence of Stone and McNamara is the administrative problem
of option evaluation.51 In neither case did the court determine the value of
the taxpayer's option since the tax for the year of receipt was not in issue. 2
But it seems likely that value determinations will be the crucial issue in future
cases. For if an employee stock option is property, all such assets should be
valued and taxed at receipt.53 However, an accurate appraisal of every option
46. INT. REv. CODE § 421(d) (1).
47. Stock must also be held six months following exercise. INT. R . Coon § 421(a).
48. Ixr. REV. CODE § 421(a) (2). This might cause minority stockholders to be dis-
satisfied with a compensatory option scheme. Lyon, Employee Stoch Options Under the
Reveniw Act of 1950, 51 Col. L REv. 1, 32 (1951).
Note that to qualify for capital gain treatment restricted options must be exercised
within three months of the termination of employment. Irr. REV. CoDE § 421(a). Options
may not extend for more than ten years or be issued to employees with over 10% of the
voting power of the employer corporation. Id. at § 421(d) (1) (C), (D).
49. See 'Miller, The "Capital Asset" Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation,
59 YALE L.. 837, 867-8, 877-8, 1057, 1082 (1950).
50. A restricted stock option plan under INT. REv. CoPn § 421 may appear to offer
greater benefits than Stone-McNamnara. But a different picture is presented when the
drawbacks of restricted options are considered. See notes 46-8 supra, and accompanying
text.
The legislative history of § 130A of the Code of 1939, the predecessor of § 421 of the
present Code, should not be interpreted merely as a clarification of existing law. The
standards in § 130A were not adopted to guarantee favorable tax treatment to an indifferent
group of optionees, leaving the rest to the possibility of the same treatment under
judge-made law. The restrictions of § 130A show that it was designed to provide pro-
prietary advantages only for those options whose function is to make partners out of
employees. SEN-. RP No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1950). In 1954 the Senate
Finance Committee reemphasized that the benefits accorded restricted options were not
to be available indiscriminately. SEN,. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 58, 61 (1954).
And the Conference Committee agreed. H.R. REm. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1954).
51. Nearly all the commentators recognize this difficulty. See Boland, Employee
Options Under the Federal Income Tax, 28 TAx:Es 415, 420-1 (1950); Wentz, Remedyi"ng
the Effect of Taxation on Management Ownership of Corporate Stoch, 43 N.U.L. REV.
442, 453 (1953); Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 706, 713-14 (1947); Blodgett, Deferred Cons-
pensation, of Executives, N.Y.U. 6TH INsT. oN FED. TAx. 764, 816 (1948).
52. The courts merely held that the options had market value. McNamara v. Com-
missioner, 210 F2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1954); Estate of Lauson Stone, 19 T.C. 872, 878
(1953). When the issue to be litigated is the amount of capital gain tax, as in Stone,
or the basis of stock, as in McNanmara, it is to the Commissioner's advantage not to
dispute the low issue values assigned to their options by taxpayers. In neither Cf these
cases, therefore, did the Commissioner challenge the correctness of the taxpayers'
estimates.
53. The fact that an employee accepts an option in lieu of cash salary payments shows
it has value. Even lack of an issue spread does not eliminate market value. See GmAmHA
& DoDD, SneuzR ANALYsis 550 (1st ed. 1934).
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-including its speculative potential-is impossible.r4 Thus, if courts are to
appraise options whenever their worth is disputed, judges will frequently have
to indulge in conjecture. 5  There may be reluctance to do this."0 In earlier
Formal differences between options should not entail different tax results. See text
at notes 37-9. Nor should variations on the word "value," such as fair market value,
market value or real value, be used to distinguish some options from others. 2 PAtL,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 18.02 (1942).
54. See authorities cited note 51 supra. See also 1 BONBRIGST, VALUATION OF PROI-
ERTY 348-9 (lst ed. 1937). In addition to valuing the option's speculative potential the
court might have to discount the effect of restrictions on the option or the stock, Compare
John C. Wahl, 19 T.C. 651 (1953), with Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154 (1952), and
Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951). See Note, 62 YALE L.J. 832 (1953) ; Comment, 21
U. OF CHI. L. REv. 464 (1954); cf. United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir.
1950).
The system of valuing puts and calls, an option method of buying and selling stock
used by brokers, cannot provide an index to the value of employee options because the
latter are exercisable for much longer periods of time and may contain restrictions.
Garner & Forsythe, Stock Warrants and Rights, 4 So. CALIF. L. REV. 269, 274 (1931).
For the same reasons these options differ from stockholder rights. GRAHAM & DODD, op.
cit. supra note 53, at 542. The Treasury is vague on the valuation of all such rights.
I.T. 2509, VIII-2 Cums. BULL. 78, 79 (1929). See Rice, The Valuation of Close Held
Stocks: A Lottery it; Federal Taxation, 98 U. OF PA. L. RV. 367 (1950).
To ignore the speculative potential of an option and find market value only in the
issue spread as some authorities have suggested, e.g., Revised Accounting Research
Bulletin No. 37, 95 J. ACCOUNTANCY 310 (1953) ; Tyler, Stock Options, 24 TAXES 611,
614 (1946), is to ignore a valuable aspect of the option device. The chance to make a
future gain is the heart of an option. BONBRIGHT, op. cit. supra at 348. Options are
generally issued to permit employees to make bargain purchases when their employer
corporations become more profitable. Baker, Stock Options for Executives, 19 HA V.
Bus. REv. 106, 109 (1940). Consequently lack of an issue spread does not eliminate
all value from an option. For examples of the trading prices of options with negative
issue spreads see GRAHAM & DODD, op. cit. snpra note 53, at 550. As speculative devices,
options may be more profitable than stocks bought on a 50% margin: during a long
upward movement of stock prices options yielded 220% greater profits; in a downward
swing option holders sustained smaller losses. 1 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPO1RA-
TIONs 254 (4th ed. 1941). For examples of the profits yielded by some options see
Baker, supra at 115.
An option may be valuable for other reasons. It may enable the optionee to buy stock
of a closely-held corporation, Ferrall, supra note 53, at 231, or to hedge agail'st
inflation, Dean, Employee Stock Options, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1403, 1405 (1953). Even
though an option has an issue spread, it retains these other features, and they should
not be ignored in an appraisal.
In Choate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1942) the speculative value of
stock rights was ignored, but the court indicated that a different result might be
reached under section 22(a) of the 1939 Code. Id. at 689. Cf. Commissioner v. Smith,
324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945). In the Smith case, however, the court suggested that value came
only from a spread. Ibid. But cf. Connolly's Estate v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 64 (6th
Cir. 1943). It was an asserted conflict with Connolly that led the Supreme Court to con-
sider Smith. Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 178 (1945).
55. See Grant Trust & Savings Co., 3 B.T.A. 1026, 1029 (1926). See also 2 PAUL,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 18.04 (1st ed. 1942).
56. In income tax cases courts tend to postpone evaluations of speculative property.
E.g., Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931) ; Westover v. Smith, 173 F.2d 90 (9th Cir.
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stock option cases courts declined to evaluate the likelihood of the failure of
conditions precedent.5 7 And elsewhere in tax law they have refused to specu-
late when appraisals of rights were hazardous because of indefinite yields 13 or
uncertain conditions of payment.5 9 If the courts choose not to speculate,co
evaluation will be postponed until exercise or sale,0 ' and any appreciation in
1949). In estate tax cases, where later valuation is impossible, courts may value
property unwillingly. Sec Burnet v. Logan, supra at 412.
57. Albert Russel Erskine, 26 B.T.A. 147 (1932); John C. Wahl, 19 T.C. 651
(1953); cf. Julian Robertson, 6 T.C. 1060 (1946); John A. McPherson, 22 B.T.A. 196
(1931).
58. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); Westover v. Smith, 173 F2d 90 (9th
Cir. 1949) ; Commissioner v. Carter, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1943). Where a reliable index
exists, courts may evaluate otherwise speculative property. Boudreau v. Commissioner,
134 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1943) ; Realty Sales Co., 10 B.T.A. 1217 (1928). If postpone-
ment of valuation is impossible, courts may value rights with conditions precedent.
Charles T. Kline, 44 B.T.A. 1052 (1941); Belmont Shore Co., 21 B.T.A. 714 (1930).
59. J. Darsie Lloyd, 33 B.T.A. 903 (1936); K. E. Merren, 18 B.T.A. 156 (1929).
However, if payment is merely postponed, the right is valued when granted. J. H.
McEwen, 6 T.C. 1018 (1946); cf. Commissioner v. S1ith, 324 U.S. 177, on relicaring,
324 U.S. 695 (1945).
60. A market for the corporation's options would provide certainty for courts.
Hazeltine Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1937); Ramapo, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 84 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1936). But this would not exist for all options. Some
corporations, of course, have none of their securities traded. But even corporations
whose stock options are sold may issue options to their employees which are different
from the options being traded. And though a market exists, peculiar conditions might
destroy the reliability of market prices. Heiner v. Crosby, 24 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1928).
For a discussion of the difficulties in the use of market quotations see 2 PAUL, op. cit.
supra note 55, at §§ 18.23, 1824.
In other cases evidence that would diminish guesswork might include:
(1) Bona fide offers to purchase the taxpayer's option. Generally such offers are
inadmissible. Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341, 348 (1903); Estate of G. A. E.
Kohler, 37 B.T.A. 1019, 1027 (1938). However, under some circumstances offers to buy
or sell are admissible. Trustees for Ohio & Big Sandy Coal Co., 15 B.T.A. 273. 287-8
(1929), re-'d on other grounds, 43 F.2d 782 (4th Cir. 1930) (offer to sell sets maximum
value); Manufacturers Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1937) (uffer
to buy sets minimum value).
(2) Expert opinions. See 2 PAm., op. cit. supra note 55, at §§ 18.41, 13.42. Expert
testimony was introduced in both Stone and McNawara. Stone's option, for which he paid
$1,00, was valued by him and his employer at $6,000. Two emxperts called by Stone
valued it at $25,000 and $30,000 respectively. Brief for Petitioner, p. 23, Commissioner
v. Stone's Estate, 210 F2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954). The Commissioner introduced no experts;
however, if value were the issue and the Commissioner called his authorities, the battle
of the experts would be on.
(3) A showing that the option's speculative value is so slight that its issue spread is
virtually its only worth. Cf. Helvering v. Tex-Penn Co., 300 U.S. 481, 499 (1937);
United States v. State Street Trust Co., 124 F.2d 948 (1st Cir. 1942). While restrictions
might reduce value, they may not eliminate it entirely. Cf. United States v. Drescher, 179
F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950); Heiner v. Gwinner, 114 F.2d 723 (3d Cir.), cerl. donied, 311
U.S. 714 (1940). Also, the option's value might be due to factors other than its specu-
lative potential or issue spread. See note 54 supra.
61. Charles I. Sorenson, 22 T.C. No. 44 (1954) ; John C. Wahl, 19 T.C. 651 (1953);
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value will be taxed at income rates.62 Thus, lack of evidence of market value
will place some employees in unfavorable tax situations.08
Adoption of the Treasury's exercise spread formula appears desirable.
This would eliminate the difficulties and inequities inherent in the Stone-
McNamara approach; it would also diminish the effectiveness of loading op-
tions with restrictions designed to reduce or eliminate their value in the eyes
of the court." Yet employee stock options would retain important tax bene-
fits. (5 If the corporation's stock declines, the executive will receive no taxable
income if he fails to exercise and a reduced amount if he does.0 If he exercises
after retirement or in any other low-income year, his compensation will be re-
Albert Russel Erskine, 26 B.T.A. 147 (1932). Cf. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931) ;
Westover v. Smith, 173 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949); Estate of Raymond T. Marshall, 20
T.C. 979 (1953).
62. See cases cited note 9 supra. But cf. Choate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 684, 687
(2d Cir. 1942).
63. Taxpayers likely to feel the discrimination will be employees of corporations too
small to have their securities traded in markets. There may be no sales-or infrequent
sales-of the stock of such corporations; the probability is greater that there will be no
sales of options. In these circumstances valuing an option is highly speculative: after
assigning a value to the corporation's stock the court must project the stock's price into
the future, estimating the likelihood of the stock price exceeding the exercise price before
the option expires; a dollar value must then be assigned to this possibility. If the option
or the stock obtainable by exercise contains restrictions, the problem is compounded. Yet
the small business employees who would be placed in a disfavored tax position are a
group which our national policy seeks to encourage. 67 STAT. 232 (1953), 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 631 (Supp. 1953).
It has been suggested that the exercise spread formula discriminates against employees
who obtain marketable options from employers rather than by purchase on the market. But
factually this situation is not likely to arise. For in anticipation of either the Stone-Mc-
Namara approach or the exercise spread formula all employees would take their compen-
sation in cash and then buy options on the market.
64. In two recent cases restricted stock given to employees was held to have no ta,.-
able value at issue or when the restrictions were removed. Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C.
154 (1952) ; Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951). But cf. United States v. Dreseher, 179
F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950). Even if the restrictions do not remove all value, they may reduce
it. For a discussion of the device see Note, 62 YALE L.J. 832 (1953) ; Comment, 21 U. oF
CHi. L. REv. 464 (1954); Note, 90 U. or PA. L. REV. 346 (1941).
65. The employer is benefitted also; the exercise spread is deductible as compensation,
not as a capital loss. I.T. 3795, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 15; Alger-Sullivan v. Commissioner,
57 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1932); cf. Gardner-Denver v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 39 (7th Cir,
1935).
66. I.T. 3795, 1946-1 Cumi. BULL. 15. If the employee were taxed at income rates
upon receipt of the option, its expiration would be a short-term capital loss. INr. REv.
CODE § 1234; cf. Nordblom Associates, Inc., 15 T.C. 220 (1950). If the spread declined
(and the option presumably decreased in value), but the employee exercised, he would
not sustain a capital loss, since exercise is not a taxable occasion. Cf. Helvering v. San
Joaquin Co., 297 U.S. 496, 500 (1936); MAGILT, TAXABLE INcOME 119 (1936). Stock-
holders receiving stock rights as dividends are not taxed until exercise; hence, no income
is realized if the optionee fails to exercise. G.C.M. 25063, 1947-1 Cum. BULL. 45;
Eastern Shares Corp., 32 B.T.A. 608 (1935).
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ceived while in a lower bracket.67 And if he retains the option until death,
neither he nor his estate need report any income.6"
An amendment to I.T. 3795 explicitly including bargain purchases would
facilitate a judicial return to the exercise spread formula by enabling the
bench to distinguish both Stone c9 and lcNawara.7° Without Treasury action
courts will have to rely on the troublesome question of intent, finding as a fact
that the exercise spread is the intended compensation. 71
67. Furthermore, the employee may exercise his option over a period of favorable
tax years to minimize his gain. Boland, Employee Options Under the Federal Income
Tax, 28 TAXEs 415, 420 r32 (1950). At 1954 rates a married taxpayer with no depend-
ents would save $27,240 in income taxes by exercising an option worth $100,000 over a
five-year period rather than in a single year (assuming other sources of income are
e.xactly offset by available deductions). 12cr. REV. CODE § 1 (a).
It might even be a hardship for the employee to pay the tax at receipt of the option; if
he lacked independent cash, he might be forced to sell his option and be unable to
capitalize on its speculative feature.
68. IxT. REv. CoDE § 1014, formerly § 113 (a) (5) of the Code of 1939. See, e.g.,
Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, modified, 295 U.S. 719 (1935); Commissioner v.
Matheson, 82 F.2d 3S0 (5th Cir. 1936). The estate will, of course, be taxed on post-
death appreciation. See, for example, Estate of Edgar V. O'Daniel, 10 T.C. 631 (194);
fack v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1945).
69. Such an amendment would remove the distinction created by Stone vhich subse-
quent tax-payers might adopt as an avoidance device. Commissioner v. Stone's Estate,
210 F2d 33, 34-5 (3d Cir. 1954). See text at notes 20-22.
Stone and McNamara might also be distinguished because both taxpayers disposed
of their options prior to the enactment of § 130A of the Code of 1939, the predecessor
of § 421 of the present Code. See note 50 mpra.
70. Meramara can be distinguished since the Seventh Circuit failed to discuss I.T.
3795. See text at notes 23-5. However, on its face the I.T. iwas applicable, and the tax-
payer was compelled to argue that it was an unjustified statutory interpretation. Brief for
Petitioner, pp. 25-30, -McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954).
71. See Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945); Charles E. Sorenson, 22 T.C.
No. 44 (1954); cf. Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954); Ifc-
Narmara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954).
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